Popular mobilisations in Lebanon: from anti-­system to sectarian claims by MEIER, Daniel
Popular mobilisations in Lebanon: from anti-system to
sectarian claims
Daniel Meier
To cite this version:
Daniel Meier. Popular mobilisations in Lebanon: from anti-system to sectarian claims.




Submitted on 28 Jun 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
	   1	  
Popular	   mobilisations	   in	   Lebanon:	   from	   anti-­‐system	   to	   sectarian	  
claims	  Daniel	  Meier	  (CNRS-­‐Pacte,	  Grenoble)	  	  
Abstract	  
In	   Lebanon,	   the	   Arab	   uprising	   is	   often	   analyzed	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   side	   effects	   the	  
Syrian	  uprising	  had	  on	  the	  country	  thanks	  to	  massive	  refugees	  influx	  and	  the	  involvement	  
of	   Sunni	   and	   Shia	   Lebanese	   in	   Syria’s	   battleground.	   In	   fact,	   popular	   mobilizations	  
happened	  prior	  and	  during	   the	   current	   crisis	  as	   two	  different	   type	  of	   effects	  of	   the	  Arab	  
uprisings	  at	  large.	  First,	  in	  late	  2010	  emerged	  an	  anti-­‐sectarian	  movement	  that	  brought	  up	  
an	   anti-­‐system	   claim	   in	   line	   with	   other	   Arab	   social	   movements	   targeting	   authoritarian	  
regimes	   and	   corruption.	   Second,	   the	   Sunni	   radical	  mobilization	   that	   started	   in	   Saida	   in	  
2011	   around	   the	   popular	   Imam	   Sheikh	   Assir,	   gathered	   resentments	   toward	   the	   Shia	  
leading	  party	  Hizbullah	  as	  involved	  alongside	  the	  Syrian	  regime	  and	  surprisingly	  adopting	  
an	   active	   minority	   mobilization	   strategy.	   Both	   movement	   conducted	   demonstrations	   of	  
different	  type	  (from	  classic	  march	  to	  on	  roads	  sit-­‐in)	  starting	  from	  a	  completely	  opposite	  
perspective	   and	   in	   a	   very	   different	   environment:	   when	   the	   anti-­‐sectarian	   mobilization	  
faded,	  the	  sectarian	  one	  rose.	  This	  paper	  will	  try	  to	  address	  the	  historical	  process	  of	  both	  
mobilizations	   and	   assess	   their	   differences	   in	   light	   of	   several	   mobilization	   theories.	   It	  
intends	   to	   raise	   questions	   about	   the	   type	   of	   actors	   involved,	   their	   discourses	   and	  
justifications,	  and	  the	  contextual	  local	  and	  political	  environments.	  	  Keywords:	  Lebanon,	  popular	  mobilization,	  anti-­‐sectarian	  movement,	  Salafist	  movement,	  discourses	  and	  justifications	  	  A	  gap	  prevailed	  for	  a	  long	  time	  between	  the	  study	  of	  societies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  through	  anthropology	   or	   political	   science	   research,	   and	   through	   the	   social	  movement	   theories	  (SMT).	  This	  area	  of	  the	  world	  was	  largely	  left	  on	  the	  sidelines	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  SMT	  and	  remained	   trapped	   within	   neo-­‐Orientalist	   readings	   on	   Islamist	   movements.	   However,	  since	   the	   new	   century,	   studies	   using	   SMT	   theoretical	   background	   in	   Middle	   Eastern	  countries	   have	   become	   more	   numerous	   and	   have	   been	   evaluated	   positively1.	   While	  English	   publications	   tend	   to	   remain	  more	   focused	   on	   general	   analyses	   like	   Lynch2	   or	  Tripp3,	   fruitful	   works	   on	   social	   movements	   and	   popular	   uprisings	   in	   several	   Arab	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countries	  have	  been	  recently	  published	  in	  edited	  books	  by	  French	  researchers	  like	  Allal	  and	   Pierret4	   or	   Bonnefoy	   and	   Catusse5.	   In	   Lebanon,	   the	   study	   of	   social	   movements	  through	  the	  prism	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  regained	  interest	  in	  the	  post-­‐civil	  war	  era	  during	  the	  1990s	  and	  reached	  a	  more	  theorised	  form	  by	  early	  2000	  with	  several	  milestones	  like	  Kingston6	  and	  Favier7	  and	  later	  on	  Karam8.	  But	  considering	  what	  did	  or	  did	  not	  happen	  in	   Lebanon	   regarding	   the	   uprising	   momentum,	   little	   has	   been	   said	   on	   local	   social	  movements	   who	   took	   the	   street	   or	   layed	   claims.	   And	   no	   clear	   links	   have	   been	  made	  between	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Syrian	  uprising	  and	  social	  mobilisations	  among	  sects	  except	  for	  security	  and	  political	  assessments9.	  	  Lebanon	  is	  a	  country	  that	  remained	  at	  	  the	  margin	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprising	  process	  after	  the	  mass	   protests	   of	   2005	   that	   set	   the	   tone	   of	   a	   society	   mobilisation	   for	   its	   dignity	   and	  freedom	   but	   also	   for	   its	   fidelity	   to	   sectarian	   patrons10.	   However,	   the	   Syrian	   uprisings	  impacted	   deeply	   within	   the	   Lebanese	   political	   game	   because	   of	   the	   previous	   old	   and	  deep	   links	   that	   existed	   between	   the	   Lebanese	   ruling	   class	   and	   the	   Syrian	   regime,	  particularly	  in	  the	  post-­‐civil	  war	  era.	  I	  have	  shown	  elsewhere	  how	  the	  two	  main	  political	  parties	   in	   the	   opposite	   coalition,	   Hizbullah	   and	   the	   Future	   Movement,	   imported	   the	  Syrian	   fault	   line	   between	   Sunnis	   and	   Alawites	   –	   largely	   built	   by	   the	   Syrian	   power	   to	  serve	  its	  mobilisation	  against	  “Islamist	  threat”	  –	  for	  their	  own	  political	  interest11.	  Within	  this	  context,	  I	  am	  going	  to	  investigate	  two	  Lebanese	  social	  movements	  which	  have	  lately	  appeared	  on	  the	  political	  scene:	  the	  Anti-­‐Sectarian	  Movement	  (ASM)	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	   initial	  uprising	   in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Movement	   initiated	  by	  Sheikh	  Ahmad	  al-­‐‘Asîr	   that	   took	   shape	   after	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Syrian	   uprising.	   They	   refer	   to	   two	  distinct	  segments	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  population	  –	  the	  secular	  vs	  the	  Sunnis	  militants	  –	  in	  two	   different	   locations	   –	   Beirut	   vs	   Saida	   –	   and	   at	   two	   different	   periods	   of	   time,	  respectively	  late	  2010/early	  2011	  and	  late	  2011/mid-­‐2013.	  	  	  The	   focus	   on	   these	   two	  mobilisations	   will	   not	   be	   done	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   “the	   civil	  society”	  concept	   firstly	  as	   it	  appears	   to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  western	  civil	   society	  conception	  that	  stays	  far	  from	  authoritarian	  regime	  contexts.	  I	  have	  rather	  chosen	  to	  rely	  on	  tools	  provided	  by	   the	   contemporary	   social	  movement	   theory,	   inspired	  by	  McAdam,	  Tarrow	  and	   Tilly’s	   perspective	   in	   Dynamics	   of	   Contention12,	   which	   proposes	   a	   relational	  perspective	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   interpersonal	   networks	   as	   well	   as	   an	   emphasis	   on	   a	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diachronic	   and	   contextualised	   analysis	   of	   mobilisation	  mechanisms.	   So	  my	  main	   goal	  will	   be	   to	   systematise	   the	   comparison	   between	   the	   anti-­‐sectarian	  movement	   and	   the	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	  with	  corresponding	   tools	  of	   the	  abovementioned	   theoretical	  framework.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  one	  can	  identify	  three	  main	  directions	  for	  a	  comparative	  investigation:	  the	  context,	  the	  networks	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  contentious	  movements13.	  The	   first	   intends	   to	   underscore	   the	   local	   context	   as	   a	   significant	   variable	   in	   order	   to	  provide	  precise	  descriptions	  of	  matrices	  of	   constraints	  and	   resources	   surrounding	   the	  two	   movements,	   including	   perceptions.	   The	   second	   will	   focus	   on	   social	   settings	   and	  informal	   networks	   in	   contention	   that	   encompass	   pre-­‐existing	   social	   movement	  organisations.	   This	   does	   not	  mean	   believing	   in	   individual	   rationality	   –	   be	   it	   based	   on	  material	   or	   culturalistic	   factors	   –	   but	   instead	   staying	   focused	   on	   the	   social	   aspect	   of	  power.	   The	   third	   consists	   in	   investigating	   what	   people	   do	   when	   they	   protest,	   which	  means	  the	  study	  of	   the	  repertoire	  of	  collective	  action.	  This	  dimension	  clearly	   links	   the	  action	   to	   its	   context;	   the	   concept	   of	   repertoire	   also	   “assumes	   a	   universe	   of	   shared	  meaning,	  prior	  to	  mobilization”14,	  like	  symbols,	  stories,	  rituals,	  etc,	  all	  highlighting	  a	  self-­‐definition	   of	   contentious	   actors	   as	   well	   as	   movements’	   identity	   regarding	   their	  vocabulary,	  behaviours,	  perceptions	  and	  actions/strategy	  within	  the	  political	  field.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  contend	  that	  despite	  their	  opposing	  postures	  on	  values	  and	  opposite	  sociological	   components,	   these	   two	  movements	  belong	   to	   the	   same	  momentum	  of	   the	  Arab	  uprising	  regarding	  its	  specific	  impact	  on	  the	  Lebanese	  socio-­‐political	  environment.	  In	  other	  words	  the	  two	  social	  movements	  under	  scrutiny	  can	  reveal	  in	  their	  functioning	  how	  the	  crisis,	  and	  the	  Syrian	  uprising	  in	  particular,	  created	  an	  environment	  that	  proved	  conducive	   for	   each	   of	   them	   at	   two	   different	   periods	   of	   time.	   This	   work	   is	   based	   on	  several	   fieldwork	  periods	   in	  Lebanon	   since	   early	  2011,	   in	   collaboration	  with	  Giacomo	  Galeno	   for	   the	   research	   on	   the	   anti-­‐sectarian	   movement.	   It	   is	   based	   on	   direct	  observation,	   interviews	  with	  militants,	  researchers,	  officials	  and	  other	  Lebanese	  actors	  in	  NGOs.	  It	  also	  relies	  on	  grey	  literature	  like	  flyers	  distributed	  during	  protests,	  sit-­‐in	  or	  marches	   and	  other	   observations	  during	  meetings	   and	  outside	  meeting	   tents.	   Finally,	   I	  refer	  to	  newspapers	  and	  Internet	  references	   for	  political	  speeches	  and	  statements	  and	  other	  secondary	  sources	  like	  academic	  papers	  related	  to	  both	  movements.	  
	  
Contexts	  of	  emergence	  and	  of	  opinion	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  When	  considering	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	   two	  movements,	  a	  striking	  difference	  appears	  regarding	   the	   context	   and	   how	   actors	   formulate	   their	   opinions	   within	   it.	   For	   ASM	  militants,	   the	   interviews	   conducted	   and	   more	   obviously	   their	   main	   slogan	   “al-­‐shaab	  yourid	   isqat	  al-­‐nizam	  al-­‐ta’ifi”	   (“The	  people	  wants	   the	   fall	  of	   the	  confessional	   regime”)	  which	  mimic	  the	  original	  “al-­‐shaab	  yourid	  isqat	  al-­‐nizam”	  (“The	  people	  wants	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  regime”)	  already	  famous	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  show	  quite	  clearly	  the	  will	  to	  link	  and	  affiliate	   their	   mobilisation	   within	   the	   regional	   mobilisation	   against	   authoritarian	  powers.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   rather	   clear	   that	   events	   in	   the	   Maghreb	   –	   the	   quick	   fall	   of	  Tunisia’s	  Ben	  Ali	   regime	   followed	  by	  Egypt’s	  Moubarak	  speeded	  up	   the	   formation	  and	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  the	  movement	  in	  Beirut.	  Its	  “anti-­‐sectarian”	  brand	  stemmed	  from	  an	  older	  claim	  that	  has	   its	  own	  history	   in	  Lebanon.	   It	   referred	  to	   the	  civil	  marriage	  claim	  that	  started	  already	  in	  the	  1950s	  as	  the	  Lebanese	  Constitution,	  in	  its	  article	  95,	  made	  it	  compulsory	   for	   every	   Lebanese	   citizen	   to	   belong	   to	   one	   of	   the	   nineteen	   recognised	  sectarian	  communities;	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  simply	  not	  possible	  to	  get	  married	  today	  in	  a	  civilian	  way	  only.	  With	  this	  Constitution	  article,	  the	  Lebanese	  Parliament	  acknowledged	  the	   power	   of	   sects	   on	   personal	   status	   and	   left	   its	   prerogatives	   on	   that	  matter	   to	   the	  religious	  authorities	  of	  each	  sectarian	  community.,	  The	  debate	  commenced	  	  anew	  with	  the	   Taïf	   Agreement,	   in	   1989,	   which	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   civil	   war	   and	   shaped	   the	   new	  Constitution	   of	   the	   Second	   Republic	   as	   it	   suggested	   to	   “de-­‐communalise”	   the	   political	  system,	   a	   task	   Elias	   Hraoui,	   the	   first	   President	   of	   the	   Republic,	   tried	   to	   undertake	   in	  1995	  but	   failed	   to	   complete	  when	   sectarian	  patrons	  opposed	   to	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   civil	  status15.	  This	  is	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  ASM	  main	  claim	  within	  the	  general	  claim	  of	  Arab	  uprisings	   targeting	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   Lebanese	  militants	   explain	   that	   contrary	   to	  other	   Arab	   countries,	   Lebanon	   has	   not	   one	   but	   several	   authoritarian	   leaders	   to	   fight,	  within	  each	  community.	  So,	  for	  ASM,	  one	  can	  follow	  Allal	  and	  Pierret16	  and	  talk	  about	  a	  spreading	  effect,	  in	  Lebanon,	  of	  this	  “revolutionary	  momentum”.	  The	  external	  factors	  are	  rooted	   in	   the	  uprising	   claims	   for	  more	   social	   justice,	  dignity	  and	  democracy	  while	   the	  local	  context	  of	  ASM	  mobilisation	  is	  marked	  by	  an	  absence	  of	  any	  political	  change	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  rulers	  as	  if	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  other	  countries	  was	  identified	  with	   a	   disease	   or	   a	   virus	   that	   may	   not	   reach	   Lebanon17.	   At	   that	   moment,	   the	   Syrian	  uprising	  did	  not	  yet	  started	  and	  only	  became	  salient	  in	  the	  public	  space	  by	  the	  summer	  2011	  when	  ASM	  faded	  away.	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  For	   its	  part,	   the	  movement	   initiated	  by	  Sheikh	  Ahmad	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  emerged	   late	  2011	  as	  a	  local	  radical	  religious	  group	  of	  a	  small	  mosque	  in	  a	  suburb	  of	  Saida	  in	  a	  context	  of	  Salafi	  clerics	   mobilisation	   supporting	   the	   Syrian	   uprising18.	   In	   his	   speeches	   and	   preaches,	  Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   referred	   from	   the	   beginning	   to	   the	   Syrian	   uprising	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	  honour	  of	  the	  Sunni	  community.	  So	  contrary	  to	  the	  ASM	  movement,	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  mobilisation	  was	   not	   inspired	   by	   the	   overthrow	   of	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   Instead,	   he	   provided	   a	  sectarian	   reading	   of	   the	   struggle	   in	   Syria	   and	   immediately	   made	   a	   link	   with	   the	  disregard	  of	  “Syrian-­‐Iranian	  tutelage	  over	  Lebanon”	  towards	  Sunni	  people.	  This	  is	  a	  sort	  of	   revamping	   of	   the	   initial	   non-­‐sectarian	   call	   of	   each	   Arab	   uprising.	   In	   sum,	   external	  factors	   for	   al-­‐‘Asîr’s	   mobilisation	   appeared	   limited	   to	   the	   Syrian	   uprising	   as	   it	   was	  understood	   as	   a	   fight	   against	   the	   Sunnis.	   And	   the	   context	   for	   the	   main	   process	   of	  successful	  mobilisation	  did	  occur	  during	  the	  year	  2012	  when	  the	  Miqati	  government	  set	  up	   its	   “dissociation	  policy”	   towards	   Syrian	  uprising	   in	   order	  not	   to	   be	   affected	  by	   the	  Syrian	  turmoil	  but	  in	  reality	  to	  seem	  neutral	  and	  continue	  to	  act	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  Syrian	  regime19.	  	  	  Both	   movements	   seemed	   to	   have	   internal	   agendas.	   The	   ASM	   one	   was	   focused	   on	   a	  regime	   change	   by	   implementing	   a	   secular	   Republic	   while	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   movement	   was	  devoted	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  Sunni	  community	  by	  denouncing	  the	  powerful	  Shi’i-­‐led	  Hizbullah	  and	   supporting	   the	   fall	   of	   the	  Assad	   regime	   in	  Damascus.	  To	  do	   so,	   the	   two	  movements	  did	  not	  have	   the	  same	  constraints	  and	  assets	   to	  act	  on	   the	  political	   scene.	  When	   it	   emerged,	   ASM	   was	   a	   civil	   society	   movement	   with	   no	   links	   to	   institutional	  politics	   because	   of	   its	   radical	   anti-­‐system	   posture.	   In	   the	   meantime,	   the	   previous	  experience	  of	  some	  of	  its	  members	  alongside	  with	  the	  Laique	  Pride	  eased	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  core	  group	  around	  some	  radical	  ideas	  and	  ideals.	  The	  movement	  did	  not	  directly	  use	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Taïf	  Agreements	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  the	  abolition	  of	  sectarianism	  in	  politics.	  But	  the	  debate	  was	  already	  well	  known	  within	  the	  society	  and	  ASM	  could	  rely	  on	  that	  to	  expect	  to	  gather	  a	  social	  dissent	  towards	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  actors.	  	  	  For	  its	  part,	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	  was	  in	  a	  weak	  position	  to	  start	  its	  mobilisation	  as	  Ahmad	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  was	  not	  a	   recognised	   cleric	   and	  was	  preaching	   in	  a	   small	  mosque	   located	   in	  a	  suburb	   of	   Saida.	   Moreover,	   his	   previous	   affiliation	   with	   Jamaa	   al-­‐Tabligh,	   a	   quietist	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religious	  movement	  that	  openly	  avoided	  any	  statement	  that	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  conflict,	  was	  not	  really	  conducive	   to	   the	  gathering	  of	  radical	  partisans.	   In	   the	  meantime,	  among	  the	  opportunities	  that	  served	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  was	  the	   length	  of	  his	   investment	   in	  that	  Mosque	  and	  his	   strategic	   opportunism	   the	  moment	   the	   uprising	   started	   in	   Syria	   in	   sidelining	  with	  Hariri’s	   Future	   Movement.	   His	   activism	   and	   his	   reputation	   as	   a	   Salafi	   figure	   spread	  during	   the	   Ramadan	   (summer	   2011)	   and	   provided	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   with	   an	   audience.	   The	  economic	   situation	   of	   Saida	   as	   a	   pauperised	   city	   suffering	   from	   a	   lack	   of	   investment	  granted	  his	  movement	  with	   followers	  among	   the	  poor	  or	  disappointed	  Sunni	   fringe	  of	  that	  Sunni	  town.	  Hizbullah	  was	  then	  useful	  for	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  as	  it	  was	  progressively	  identified	  as	   the	   evil	   Shiite	   group	   that	   could	   be	   blamed	   for	   their	   disempowerment	   and	   for	  threatening	   the	   Sunni	   in	   the	   region	   and	   in	   Lebanon.	   The	   May	   2008	   events	   –	   during	  which	  Hizbullah	  took	  the	  street	  by	  force	  in	  West	  Beirut	  to	  constrain	  the	  Sunni	  leaders	  to	  pull	   back	   on	   a	   political	   decision	   –	  were	   reminded	   several	   times	   as	   a	  wound	   to	   Sunni	  honour	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   repaired.	   	   In	   sum,	   the	   internal	   context	   of	   emergence	   of	   the	  movement	  of	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  conflict	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  its	  reputation,	   the	  necessity	  of	   identifying	  a	   local	  antagonist	   figure,	  Hizbullah,	   threatening	  the	  community	  to	  legitimise	  the	  struggle	  for	  the	  Sunni	  pride.	  	  
Networks	  for	  mobilisations	  
	  In	  the	  perspective	  of	  “looking	  for	  the	  weapon	  of	  the	  weak”20,	  I	  am	  now	  going	  to	  consider	  the	   social	   context	   of	   the	   networks	   and	   the	   power	   relations	   they	   embody	   in	   both	   case	  studies,	   assessing	   the	   conditions	   that	   render	   those	   mobilisations	   possible.	   The	   anti–sectarian	   movement	   founded	   support	   and	   resources	   in	   the	   network	   of	   civil	   society	  actors	  stemming	  from	  militant	  groups	  of	  the	  1990s	  that	  all	  sustained	  an	  ideal	  of	  secular	  society	  for	  Lebanon.	  These	  groups,	  associations,	  and	  NGOs,	  brought	  their	  expertise	  and	  skills	   built	   during	   years	   and	   through	  past	   experience	   into	   the	  ASM.	   There	   are	   several	  generations	  of	  actors	  within	  it	  and	  no	  linear	  history,	  but	  at	  least	  one	  can	  find	  a	  starting	  point	  in	  2010	  with	  the	  first	  “Laique	  Pride”	  movement.	  This	  first	  gathering	  originated	  on	  Facebook	  talks	  among	  activists	   to	  promote	  a	  secular	  change	   in	  Lebanon,	   focusing	  on	  a	  claim	   for	   a	   secular	   law	   for	   personal	   status	   including	   marriages.	   Many	   among	   these	  people	   still	   had	   a	   militancy	   network	   and	   were	   involved	   in	   promoting,	   in	   a	   way	   or	  another,	   secularism	   in	   Lebanon.	   Groups	   or	   NGOs	   which	   responded	   to	   the	   call	   for	   a	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“Laique	   Pride”	  were,	   among	   others,	   l’	   “Union	   des	   Jeunes	   Libanais	   Démocratiques,”	   “le	  Mouvement	   de	   la	   société	   civile”	   linked	   to	   the	   “Mouvement	   Social“	   created	   in	   2001	  by	  Mgr.	  Gregoire	  Haddad,	  the	  Secular	  Club	  of	  AUB,	  and	  “le	  Rassemblement	  populaire	  pour	  la	  laïcité”.	  When	  the	  meeting	  of	  this	  Laique	  Pride	  occurred	  on	  25	  April	  2010,	  gathering	  roughly	  5000	  participants,	   it	   created	  hope	   for	   the	   following	  up	  and	   re–opening	  of	   the	  debate	  among	  a	  vivid	  civil	  society.	  Later	  on,	  an	  informal	  meeting	  took	  place,	  under	  the	  name	   of	   “Rencontre	   séculière”	   that	   aimed	   at	   coordinating	   efforts	   to	   shape	   an	   anti–sectarian	  movement	  of	  broader	  size.	  	  	  The	  main	   strategy	   of	   the	   organisers	   was	   to	   target	   the	   confessional	   system	   through	   a	  specific	  problematic	  like	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  electoral	  law,	  and	  the	  law	  for	  a	  civil	  personal	  status.	   The	   movement	   also	   aimed	   at	   targeting	   the	   system	   of	   governance	   in	   itself	   by	  voicing	   their	   interest	   in	   the	   promotion	   of	   social	   justice	   and	   of	   the	   struggle	   against	  corruption.	  After	   the	   flight	   of	  Ben	  Ali	   from	  Tunisia	   and	   the	  breakdown	  of	  Mubarak	   in	  Egypt	  on	  11	  February	  2011,	  the	  Laique	  Pride	  gave	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  20	  February	  to	  announce	   the	   2011	   edition	   of	   its	   demonstration.	   During	   the	   press	   conference,	   a	   split	  appeared	   as	   several	  members	   expressed	   their	  will	   to	   expand	   their	   claims,	   taking	   into	  consideration	  the	  regional	  context	  of	  the	  Arab	  uprising.	  The	  “Rencontre	  séculière”	  then	  launched	  a	  call	  on	  social	  networks	  to	  gather	  on	  Sunday	  27	  February	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  sectarian	  system.	  	  	  While	   no	   long-­‐term	   strategy	   was	   initially	   taken,	   this	   newly	   born	   Anti–Sectarian	  Movement	   succeeded	   in	   gathering	   large	   numbers	   of	   participants	   in	   several	   cities	   in	  Lebanon.	  Its	  short-­‐term	  and	  broad	  strategy	  as	  an	  independent	  movement	  was	  to	  bet	  on	  a	   full-­‐scale	   national	   mobilisation	   in	   every	   region	   of	   the	   country.	   After	   the	   initial	  demonstration	   on	   27	   February,	   the	   ASM	   succeeded	   in	   gathering	   four	   other	  demonstrations	  in	  four	  other	  locations,	  with	  great	  success	  in	  Beirut	  when	  approximately	  20,000	  people	  marched	  from	  East	  to	  West	  Beirut	  on	  20	  March	  2011.	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  gathering	   also	   came	   from	   its	   self-­‐perception	   as	   a	   silent	   majority	   becoming	   defiant	  towards	   traditional	   political	   parties	   and	   expressing	   the	   will	   to	   change	   the	   sectarian	  system	  (al-­‐nizâm	  al-­‐taifi)	  for	  social,	  political	  and	  judicial	  purposes.	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The	   social	   context	   in	   Saida	   in	   2011,	   when	   Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   started	   his	   mobilisation,	   is	  marked	   by	   the	   polarisation	   of	   the	   Lebanese	   political	   forces	   towards	   the	   Syrian	   crisis,	  namely	  Al-­‐Mustaqbal	  facing	  8-­‐March	  local	  ally	  Mustapha	  Saad	  and	  Hizbullah	  militants	  in	  the	  city	  and	  its	  surroundings.	  The	  socioeconomic	  situation	  in	  Saida	  was	  already	  critical	  and	   behind	   the	   touristic	   reshaping	   of	   roads	   and	   streets	   in	   the	   old	   city,	   a	   process	   of	  pauperisation	  affected	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  local	  inhabitants,	  mostly	  Sunni,	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  investments	  which	  together	  created	  a	  slow	  disenfranchisement	  of	  the	  population	  towards	   national	   concerns	   except	   for	   its	   local	   Sunni	   constituency.	   This	   sectarian	  affiliation	   soon	   became	   the	   only	   common	   identity	   for	   inhabitants	   who	   perceived	  themselves	   as	   abandoned	   by	   the	   central	   power	   and	   instrumentalised	   by	   the	   main	  political	  parties.	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	   found	  a	   fertile	  ground	  there	   for	  his	  mobilisation	  based	  on	   resentment	   and	   a	   feeling	   of	   marginalisation.	   He	   was	   also	   able	   to	   capitalise	   on	   a	  frustration	  towards	  the	  Shiites	  because	  of	  the	  political	  fight	  of	  early	  May	  2008	  that	  saw	  a	  confrontation	   between	   Hizbullah	   and	   the	   Siniora-­‐led	   14	   March	   government.	   During	  these	   boxing	   days,	   Hizbullah’s	   militiamen	   and	   allies	   sealed	   off	   West	   Beirut,	   stranded	  Walid	   Joumblatt	   and	   Saad	  Hariri21	   in	   their	   houses,	   thus	   shedding	   a	   crude	   light	   on	   the	  Future	   Movement’s	   impotence	   towards	   the	   Shi’i	   movement.	   In	   the	   following	   years,	  several	   attacks	   targeted	   senior	   security	   officers	   and	   political	   leaders,	   all	   of	   them	  stemming	  from	  the	  Sunni	  community.	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  was	  then	  able	  to	  play	  on	  sectarian	  honour,	   transforming	   a	   political	   weakness	   into	   a	   sectarian	   threat.	   This	   link	   between	  sects-­‐politics-­‐honour	  was	  repeated	  in	  Friday	  preaches.	  	  	   “We	  won’t	  accept	  this	  abject	  (haqīra)	  Syrian-­‐Iranian	  tutelage	  (over	  Lebanon)	  !	  [...]	  Enough	  contempt	  for	  the	  Sunnis	  !	  Enough	  contempt	  for	  their	  blood,	  their	  security	  and	  the	  honour	  of	  their	  wives	  !	  »22	  	  Manufacturing	   a	   sectarian	   reading	  of	   the	   situation	  Al-­‐‘Asîr	  was	   able	   to	  mobilise	   anger	  and	   dissatisfaction,	   blaming	   the	   pro-­‐Syrian	   partisans	   identified	   with	   the	   Shia	  community.	  To	  illustrate	  this	  strategy	  of	  sectarianisation	  of	  the	  dissent	  toward	  the	  Shia,	  the	  religious	  dispute	  with	  Muhammad	  Yazbek,	  a	  top	  rank	  leader	  of	  the	  Party	  of	  God,	  is	  a	  good	  example	  as	   it	  also	  raised	  concern	  with	  Hizbullah	   itself23.	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  started	  a	  religious	   dispute	   after	   a	   Yazbek	   speech	   allegedly	   “insulted”	   Aisha,	   the	   mother	   of	   the	  Prophet,	   and	   thus	   positioned	   himself	   as	   the	   defender	   of	   the	   Sunni	   community.	   	   This	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sensitive	  matter	  in	  a	  pluri-­‐sectarian	  society	  granted	  him	  with	  a	  full	  media	  attention	  and	  allowed	   him	   to	   reach	   a	   larger	   Sunni	   constituency,	   close	   to	   Al-­‐Mustaqbal,	   bridging	   the	  religious	  with	   the	  political	  dissent	  when	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  mentioned	   the	  Hizbullah	  weaponry,	  a	  classical	  topic	  of	  the	  14	  March	  coalition.	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  posture	  lay	  in	  the	  powerful	  position	  of	   his	   Shi’i	   foe	   in	   the	  political	   game	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  on	   the	  other	   in	   the	  brutality	   of	   the	   repression	   the	   Syrian	  population,	  mainly	   Sunnis,	   suffered	   from	   the	   al-­‐Asad	  regime.	  This	  power,	  labelled	  as	  Alawite	  because	  of	  its	  sectarian	  affiliation,	  has	  been	  affiliated	  with	   Shi’i	   belief	   since	   the	   onset	   of	   the	   Syrian	   uprising	   in	   Salafi	   circles,	   thus	  showing	  an	  evil	  alliance	  between	  the	  two	  minorities	  in	  Islam,	  the	  Alawites	  and	  the	  Shia.	  This	   “natural”	   explanation	   of	   their	   political	   alliance	   helped	   Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   to	   identify	  Hizbullah	   as	   the	   internal	   threat	   for	   the	   Sunnis	   of	   Lebanon	   and	   so	   positioned	   this	  community	  as	  a	  victim	  and	  possibly	  as	  a	  gatekeeper	  of	  the	  Islamic	  orthodoxy	  toward	  the	  deviant	  ones24.	  	  	  In	  sum,	   the	  networks	   for	  mobilisation	  are	   totally	  different	  as	   they	  rely	  on	   two	  distinct	  type	   of	   attitude	   toward	   the	   social	   environment.	   When	   ASM	   tried	   to	   politicized	   the	  sectarian	  issue	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  system,	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  tried	  to	  do	  the	  exact	   opposite	   in	   sectarianising	   the	   political	   dissent	   with	   Hizbullah,	   using	   each	  opportunity	  to	  remind	  its	  constituency	  of	  the	  threat	  the	  Shia	  can	  be	  for	  the	  Sunnis.	  The	  ideological	  networks	  on	  which	  ASM	  built	  its	  mobilisation	  and	  its	  identity	  is	  thus	  in	  stark	  contrast	  with	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  sectarian	  mobilisation.	  
	  
Repertoires,	  identities	  and	  the	  vocabulary	  of	  mobilisation	  
	  Investigating	   contentious	   practices	   can	   be	  made	   using	   Tilly’s	   notion	   of	   “repertoire	   of	  collective	  action”	  as	  it	  allows	  the	  observer	  to	  look	  at	  detailed	  aspects	  of	  a	  protest,	  modes	  of	  action,	  constraints	  and	  resources	  of	  protesters	  in	  action,	  their	  cohesion	  and	  their	  self-­‐definition.	   By	   providing	   an	   in-­‐depth	   look	   at	   “how”	   mobilisations	   are	   organised,	   the	  conceptual	   category	   of	   “repertoire”	   offers	  means	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   identity	   of	   political	  causes	   and	   on	   the	   vocabulary	   of	   motives	   people	   are	   using	   (elitist/populist,	  oppositional/radical).	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As	   seen	   above,	   the	   ASM	   protesters	   decided	   to	   organise	   several	   marches	   and	  demonstrations	  in	  different	   locations	  in	  the	  main	  cities	  of	  Lebanon.	  They	  faced	  a	   lot	  of	  resistance	   among	   the	   State	   bureaucracy	   as	   no	   political	   forces	   were	   supporting	   them.	  This	  meant	  that	  they	  faced	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior	  that	   is	  granting	  such	   permits	   and	   showed	   a	   strong	   will	   to	   be	   heard.	   This	   high	   motivation	   of	   the	  demonstrators	   can	   explain	   the	   success	   they	   finally	   reached	   when	   demonstrations	  culminated	  with	   the	   approximately	  20,000	  people	   gathering	   in	  Beirut	   in	   a	  march	   that	  ran	   from	   Sassine-­‐East	   Beirut,	   a	   Christian	   hotspot	   to	   Sanayeh-­‐West	   Beirut	   in	   Muslim	  suburbs,	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Interior.	  Two	  days	  prior	  to	  this	  mass	  demonstration	  in	   downtown	   Beirut	   on	   20	   March	   	   2011,	   a	   group	   of	   activists	   affiliated	   with	   ASM	  organised	   a	   sit-­‐in	  with	   tents	   at	   Riad	   al-­‐Solh	   Square	   –	   close	   to	   the	   Parliament	   and	   the	  financial	   district	   of	   Beirut	   –	   to	   protest	   the	   government’s	   inaction	   in	   adopting	   a	   civil	  marriage	  law25.	  Banners	  were	  reading	  “Freedom	  of	  Belief,	  Freedom	  of	  Thought”,	  a	  claim	  also	   heard	   in	   other	   ASM	   marches.	   The	   same	   day,	   two	   other	   rallies	   took	   place	   in	  Nabatiyeh	   and	   Baalbek	   with	   the	   main	   slogan	   chanted.	   In	   the	   organisers’	   view,	  implementing	  legislation	  for	  a	  secular	  State	  that	  would	  change	  the	  power	  establishment,	  would	  create	  a	  “domino	  effect,”	  undermining	  the	  impact	  of	  sectarianism	  on	  the	  society	  and	   therefore	   on	   the	   client-­‐patron	   system,	   a	   corrupt	   and	   poor	   governance	   of	   public	  goods	   responsible	   for	   a	   lack	   of	   social	   justice.	   These	  demonstrations	  were	   also	   a	   great	  success	   regarding	   the	   diversity	   of	   people	   they	   brought	   together:	   Lebanese	   as	   well	   as	  Palestinians,	  women	  and	  men	  from	  various	  age	  categories	  and	  from	  different	  sects	  too.	  Regarding	   the	   ideological	   orientation	   of	   those	  marches,	   one	   can	   note	   the	   presence	   of	  several	  civil	  society	  associations	  and	  advocacy	  NGOs	  as	  well	  as	  few	  leftist	  and	  secularist	  intellectuals,	   few	  religious	  personalities	  Christians	  as	  well	  as	  Muslims,	  and	  some	  leftist	  political	  parties.	  
	  Regarding	  its	  members,	  ASM	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  mainly	  elitist	  and	  radical	  movement.	  When	   asked	   to	   comment	   on	   their	   experience	   during	   that	   spring	   of	  mobilisation,	   ASM	  activists	  expressed	  discomfort	  regarding	  what	  they	  felt	  as	  two	  main	  problems	  linked	  to	  the	   cohesion	   of	   the	   group.	   Firstly,	   there	  was	   a	  massive	   influx	   of	   new	  young	  members	  bringing	   pluralistic	   points	   of	   views,	   because	   of	   the	   social	   network	   call	   for	   meetings,	  owing	  to	  some	  of	  them.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  two	  options/visions	  for	  the	  future	  of	   ASM	   mobilisations:	   one	   could	   be	   described	   as	   the	   reformist	   line,	   calling	   for	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opportunistic	   alliances	   with	   several	   political	   parties,	   and	   the	   second	   option	   could	   be	  seen	   as	   the	   revolutionary	   line,	   with	   a	   radical	   position	   as	   it	   refused	   any	   kind	   of	  collaboration	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  any	  sort	  of	  “recuperation”	  of	  the	  social	  movement	  giving	  popular	   legitimacy	   to	  any	  political	  party.	  Another	  problem	   that	  ASM	   faced	  was	  due	   to	  political	   interferences	   as	   SSNP	   and	   Amal	   tried	   to	   take	   control	   of	   the	   movement,	  sometimes	   using	   threat.	   Such	   problems	   aggravated	   the	   moment	   several	   members	  expressed	  their	  desire	  to	  show	  solidarity	  with	  the	  Syrian	  protesters.	  One	  can	  note	  that	  some	   members	   then	   chose	   to	   leave	   the	   ASM	   in	   such	   a	   troubled	   environment	   thus	  showing	  the	  limit	  of	  the	  political	  scope	  allowed	  by	  main	  political	  parties	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  the	  mobilisation	  when	  people	  opt-­‐out.	  	  The	  opportunistic	  attitude	  of	  the	  ruling	  class	  towards	  the	  ASM	  movement	  was	  twofold:	  either	  to	  use	  their	  claims	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  a	  new	  asset	  in	  the	  political	  debate	  (Joumblatt,	  Berri)	  or	  to	  try	  to	  integrate	  the	  movement	  in	  a	  political	  campaign	  (Hariri),	  all	  positions	  having	  a	  political	  agenda	  and	  none	  of	  them	  really	  wanting	  to	  consider	  the	  movement	  as	  a	   social	   force	   in	   itself.	   Several	   segments	   of	   this	   ASM	   group	   re-­‐launched	   a	   new	  mobilisation	  for	  social	  justice	  that	  gathered	  400	  people	  on	  27	  February	  2012,	  expecting	  to	   reawake	   the	   anti-­‐sectarian	   movement	   one	   year	   after	   the	   initial	   gathering26.	   Some	  others	  took	  part	   in	  the	  annual	  Laique	  Pride	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	   lukewarm	  success	  that	  year,	   gathering	   only	   3000	   people	   for	   a	  march	   on	   6	  May27.	   And	   finally,	   another	   group	  emerging	   from	  ASM	  chose	   to	  mobilise	   in	   a	  Civil	   Campaign	   for	  Electoral	  Reform	  on	  13	  May	   and	   organised	   a	   march	   towards	   the	   Parliament,	   asking	   for	   a	   new	   electoral	   law	  based	  on	  proportionality	  and	  decreasing	  the	  voting	  age	  to	  1828.	  
	  Contrary	   to	   the	   collective	   dimension	   of	   the	  ASM	  movement,	   the	   Salafist	  movement	   of	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  was	   intrinsically	   linked	   to	  his	  person.	   In	   this	   sense,	  his	  movement	  was	  more	  familiar	  within	  the	  Lebanese	  political	  realm	  as	  the	  personalisation	  of	  power	  can	  be	  identified	   as	   one	  main	   trend	   in	   politics29.	   Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   became	   known	   as	   a	   salafist	  between	  2000	   and	  2003	   as	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   he	   followed	   the	  doctrinal	   principles	   of	  salafism30.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  al-­‐‘Asîr,	  like	  other	  sheikhs,	  wanted	  to	  promote	  an	  image	  of	  himself	  as	  a	  non-­‐sectarian	  figure	  to	  show	  his	  moderation	  in	  the	  media	  outlets	  more	  than	  trying	   to	   gather	   a	   larger	   spectrum	   than	   the	   Sunni	   citizens	   he	   primarily	   targeted.	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Nevertheless,	  the	  populist	  and	  radical	  dimensions	  of	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	  can	  be	  highlight	  by	  examining	  the	  steps	  and	  repertoire	  of	  mobilisation	  adopted.	  	  	  During	  a	  first	  period	  of	  time,	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  organised	  demonstrations	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Syrian	  uprisings	   or	   against	   the	   Hizbullah	   weapons,	   clearly	   investing	   the	   polarisation	   of	   the	  political	   spectrum	   towards	   the	   Syrian	   uprising.	   Mobilising	   through	   social	  medias,	   the	  Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   movement	   grew	   in	   number	   and	   tended	   to	   radicalise	   its	   action	   by	  organizing	  a	   sit-­‐in	   in	  Saida	  during	  one	  month	  and	  a	  half,	  blocking	  a	  main	   road	  and	  so	  continuing	   its	  entrism	  strategy,	   raising	   the	   flag	  of	   the	  Sunni	  community	   threatened	  by	  weapons	   of	   Hizbullah.	   He	   then	   explained	   this	   new	   repertoire	   by	   an	   analogy	  with	   the	  Arab	  uprising	  in	  Egypt:	  “Our	  movement	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  on	  Tahrir	  Square	  in	  Cairo.	  But	  the	  difference	  is	  that	  here	  injustice	  is	  armed”31.	  He	  also	  gave	  a	  self-­‐definition	  of	  his	  protest	   as	   intended	   to	   gather	   people	   from	   everywhere	   in	   Lebanon	   as	   “all	   regions	   of	  Lebanon	  are	  hurt”	   and	  mentioning	   regions	   that	   encompass	   all	   sects	   (Maronite,	  Druze,	  Sunni	  and	  Shiites).	  Al-­‐‘Asîr	  clearly	  mentioned	  who	  hurt	  these	  regions	  when	  identifying	  the	   Shi’i	  movement	   of	   Hizbullah	   naming	   it	   through	   its	   “Resistance”	   label	   to	   show	   the	  deviant	  nature	  of	  Hizbullah	  since	  its	  involvement	  alongside	  the	  Syrian	  regime:	  “You	  can	  live	  without	  bread	  or	  electricity	  but	  not	  without	  dignity.	  The	  Resistance	  party	  stole	  our	  dignity.	  From	  now	  on	  we	  cannot	  accept	  this	  anymore”32.	  	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  later	  that	  year,	  another	  protest	  of	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	  turned	  to	  a	  proper	  fight	  as	  some	  of	  his	  partisans	  were	  showing	  weapons.	  Hizbullah	  local	  militia	  hit	  back	  (or	  provoked)	  at	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  militiamen,	  killing	  two.	  Days	  after,	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  displayed	  bloody	  images	  on	   billboards	   showing	   the	   two	   faces	   of	   his	   partisans	   killed,	   with	   a	   Hizbullah	   flag	  tarnished	   with	   blood	   and	   including	   a	   sentence	   reading	   “Hassan	   Nasrallah	   killed	   Ali	  Samhoun	   in	   Saida”	   and	   “Hassan	   Nasrallah	   killed	   Lebanon”.	   This	   strategy	   of	   mass	  communication	   tended	   to	   show	   that	   Hizbullah	   is	   clearly	   threatening	   the	   Sunni	  community	  as	   it	  killed	  two	  Sunni	  partisans	  of	  the	  Sheikh.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  this	  event	  signalled	   a	   process	   of	  militarisation	   of	   the	  movement	   that	  was	   observable	   early	   2013	  when	  the	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  himself	  publicly	  appeared	  in	  a	  military	  fatigue	  with	  a	  rifle	  AK-­‐47	  in	  his	  hand,	  during	  a	  strong	  protest	  against	  the	  presence	  of	  Hizbullah	  militiamen	  in	  the	   surroundings	   of	   his	   Mosque	   in	   Abra33.	   This	   image	   was	   widely	   spread	   as	   it	   was	  displaying	  a	  stronger	  and	  committed	  message	  to	  his	  partisans.	  For	  its	  part,	  the	  Lebanese	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state	  and	  namely	  the	  minister	  of	  Interior,	  close	  to	  8	  March	  ruling	  government,	  dismissed	  such	   accusations	   targeting	  Hizbullah,	   called	   for	   dialogue	   but	   did	   not	   intervene	   on	   the	  ground	  to	  disarm	  the	  al-­‐‘Asîr’s	  militants.	  	  A	  third	  and	  last	  step	  was	  reached	  later	  during	  the	  spring	  of	  2013	  when	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  proclaimed	  a	  “fatwa”	  that	  was	  raising	  the	  Jihâd	  for	  Syria	  in	  the	  backdrop	  of	  the	  Qussayr	  battle	   that	   saw	   the	   Syrian	   Army	   being	   backed	   by	   Hizbullah	   members	   against	   the	  insurgents	  of	  the	  Free	  Syrian	  Army.	  In	  April,	  close	  to	  his	  Mosque	  in	  Abra,	  members	  of	  al-­‐‘Asîr	   movement	   set	   up	   tents	   and	   carpets	   in	   the	   street	   to	   expand	   the	   surface	   for	   the	  Friday	  preach	  and	  huge	  screens	  to	  display	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  Sheikh	  delivering	  his	  speech.	  Following	   this	   period	   a	   new	  militia	   primarily	   dedicated	   to	   enrol	   local	  militants	   to	   go	  fighting	  in	  Syria	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  Sunnis34was	  publicly	  displayed,	  as	  an	  affiliate	  group	  to	   Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr,	   under	   the	   name	   of	   “Phalanges	   of	   the	   Free	   Resistance”.	   During	   the	  same	   days,	  Hizbullah	   General	   Secretary	   revealed	   the	   involvement	   of	   his	  militia	   in	   the	  Qussayr	   battle,	   alongside	   with	   Bashar	   el-­‐Assad	   regime.	   In	   June	   several	   militiamen	  clearly	   affiliated	  with	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   group,	   armed	  with	   light	  weapons,	   took	   control	   of	   Saida	  during	  few	  hours35.	  Few	  days	  later,	  a	  violent	  clash	  erupted	  at	  an	  Army	  check-­‐point	  near	  Abra	  killing	  4	   soldiers	   and	  urging	   the	   intervention	  of	   troops	   that	  dislodged	  and	  killed	  many	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  partisans	  in	  an	  extremely	  brutal	  fight	  of	  48	  hours36.	  	  As	  seen	  above,	   the	   two	  movements	  differ	  by	  many	  aspects	  regarding	   the	  repertoire	  of	  mobilisation	  although	  they	  both	  used	  demonstrations	  and	  sits-­‐in	  as	  a	  protest	  technique.	  The	   personalisation	   and	   charismatic	   register	   of	   al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	   contrasts	  with	   the	  pluralist	   and	  democracy-­‐oriented	  ASM	  movement.	   The	   identity	   of	   both	  movements	   in	  this	   regard	   is	   totally	   opposed:	   ASM	   showed	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   profiles	   among	   its	  participants	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  country;	  the	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	  tended	  to	  gather	  mainly	   Sunni	   young	   men	   of	   the	   Saida	   region.	   The	   fate	   of	   both	   movements	   is	   also	  revealing	  about	  their	  identities	  and	  structures:	  while	  the	  ASM	  transformed	  into	  several	  groups	   each	   of	   then	   focusing	   on	   one	   key-­‐question	  with	   a	   perspective	   of	   changing	   the	  law,	   the	   al-­‐‘Asîr	  movement	   chose	   the	   confrontation	   after	   a	   radicalisation	   process	   and	  disappeared	  as	  a	  movement	  when	  Sheikh	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  vanished	   into	   thin	  air	  after	   the	  Abra	  battle.	   Tellingly,	   the	   three	   steps	   of	   this	   radicalisation	   process	   above	   mentioned	   are	  showing	   the	   dependency	   and	   the	   adaptation	   of	   Sheikh	   al-­‐‘Asîr	   regarding	   local	   and	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regional	  events	  and	  constraining	   its	  movement	   to	  behave	  more	  radically	   following	  the	  violent	   development	   in	   Syria.	   By	   contrast,	   the	   ASM	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   depend	   on	   local	  events	  and	  tried	  to	  avoid	  mingling	  with	  the	  polarised	  topic	  of	   the	  Syrian	  uprising	  as	   it	  finally	   brought	   political	   parties	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   movement,	   undermining	   the	  struggle	  for	  the	  initial	  claims.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  This	  paper	  presented	  a	   comparative	   reading	  of	   two	  social	  movements	  which	  emerged	  with	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Arab	   uprisings	   in	   late	   2010.	   Following	   a	   SMT	   approach,	   I	  proposed	   a	   relational	   framework	   with	   a	   focus	   on	   interpersonal	   networks	   allowing	   a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  social	  movements	  and	  their	  political	  environment.	   This	   perspective	   was	   divided	   into	   three	   lines	   of	   approach.	   The	   first,	  referring	   to	   contexts	   of	   emergence	   of	   social	   movements,	   showed	   the	   important	  differences	   between	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   uprising	   process	   with	   the	   high	   hopes	   and	  expectations	  of	  ASM	  protesters	  and	  an	  enthusiasm	  to	  believe	  in	  a	  historical	  opportunity	  for	   a	   political	   change	   compared	   to	   the	   anger	   and	   resentment	   motivating	   al-­‐‘Asîr	  militants	  within	   a	   context	   of	   turmoil	   in	   Syria	   and	   the	  breakdown	  of	  hopes	   after	  other	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  other	  societies	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.	  	  	  The	   second	   line	   focused	   on	   the	   social	   context	   of	   networks	   and	   the	   power	   relations	  surrounding	   the	   two	   social	  movements.	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	  here	   that	   both	   faced	   a	  common	  sectarian	  context	  but	  took	  diametric	  positions	  towards	  it,	  combating	  it	  (ASM)	  or	  playing	  the	  sectarian	  card	  even	  more	  firmly	  (al-­‐‘Asîr).	  Means	  to	  mobilise	  thus	  refer	  to	  a	  vision	  of	   the	  world,	  with	  ASM	   identifying	   the	  State	  as	   the	  main	   target	   for	   its	   radical	  project	  of	  change	  (secularisation)	  and	  al-­‐‘Asîr’s	  movement	   identifying	  Hizbullah	  as	   the	  figure	  of	  the	  main	  threat.	  Their	  mobilisations	  were	  both	  rooted	  in	  previous	  experience	  and	  trajectories	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  politics	  they	  were	  already	  dealing	  with	  during	  the	  previous	   decade.	   For	   both	   of	   them,	   the	   use	   of	   social	   medias	   helped	   to	   recruit	   new	  militants	   but	   then	   the	  main	   difference	   appeared	   as	   the	   ASM	  worked	   as	   a	   democratic	  forum	   and	   al-­‐‘Asîr’s	   mobilisation	   was	   gathering	   around	   the	   figure	   and	   the	  speeches/preaches	  of	  its	  Sheikh.	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The	   third	   line	   underlined	   the	   consequence	   of	   this	   completely	   different	   manner	   to	  envision	   politics	   through	   the	   analysis	   of	   their	   protest	   actions,	   speeches,	   slogans	   or	  behaviours,	   the	   repertoires.	   While	   the	   ASM	   finally	   dissolved	   its	   movement	   once	   the	  initial	   process	   of	   bringing	   the	   subject	   of	   secularisation	   of	   the	   state	   at	   the	   agenda	   of	  political	   actors	   of	   the	   system	   had	   been	   completed	   and	   spread	   its	   forces	   in	   several	  specific	  topics,	  al-­‐‘Asîr	  radicalised	  to	  the	  ultimate	  point	  of	  violence	  and	  ended	  in	  a	  brutal	  clash	  with	  the	  Army	  probably	  due	  to	  Hizbullah’s	  intention	  to	  erase	  this	  movement	  as	  a	  dangerous	   catalyst	   of	   anger	   towards	   the	   Shi’a.	   While	   both	   were	   radicals,	   their	  repertoires	  of	  mobilisation	  revealed	  an	  opposite	  strategy	  of	  communication	  based	  on	  an	  elitist	   trend	   for	  ASM	  and	  a	  populist	  manner	   to	  deal	  with	  partisans	   for	  al-­‐‘Asîr.	   In	  sum,	  the	  two	  movements	  are	  depicting	  an	  evolution	  of	  the	  Lebanese	  society	  and	  its	  political	  system	  when	  facing	  popular	  uprisings	  in	  a	  distant	  vs	  close	  neighbourhood.	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